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ABSTRACT:   
 
The Digital Forgeries though not visibly identifiable to human perception it may alter or 
meddle with underlying natural statistics of digital content. Tampering involves fiddling with 
video content in order to cause damage or make unauthorized alteration/modification. 
Tampering detection in video is cumbersome compared to image when considering the 
properties of the video. Tampering impacts need to be studied and the applied 
technique/method is used to establish the factual information for legal course in judiciary. In 
this paper we give an overview of the prior literature and challenges involved in video forgery 
detection where passive approach is found. 
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[1] INTRODUCTION  
The video file generated by the camera as a specified extension depending on the 
container, which describes the structure of file with the help of metadata. The content of the 
video is an encoded stream of bytes i.e. codec; which is the chief determiner of quality. 
Popular container can hold many codec’s, for example .MOV file containing H.264 data. 
Video is basically group of pictures (GOP) organised into frames in a specific sequence. It is 
a collection of consecutive frames or GOP’s with temporal dependency in a three 
dimensional plane. All frames within a single camera action comprise a shot. A scene is one 
or more shots that form a semantic unit. Encoding a video involves operation such as 
quantization which leaves a unique fingerprint on the sequence itself. 
Intentional modification/alteration of the digital video for fabrication is referred to as 
digital video forgery. Implication of it depends upon the circumstance and where it is used. 
Particularly in the movie, political and medical world its impact is enormous where it is used 
to defame a personality, hide or forge important information to falsify or conceal actual. Wide 
usage or sharing of videos in social media like WhatsApp, Youtube, Facebook and news 
channels has a huge impact in our daily lives. ”Seeing is no longer believing” [1]. Integrity 
and authenticity of video being displayed cannot be accepted blindly anymore.  Growth in 
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video tampering has a multidimensional effect on the stakeholders involved. In order to prove 
its integrity various forgery detection schemes have been devised by several scientists 
working in this domain. 
Video forgery detection can be broadly classified into active and passive based 
approaches. 
In active approach digital video undergoes some pre processing like watermark 
insertion, digital signatures etc which would degrade the performance of the video to certain 
extent at the time of creation of the video. If the video is forged then recovery of the 
watermark or signature would not be possible and identification of it will result in tampering 
detection. Active approach cannot be used in scenarios where there is no pre-processing 
insertions done (watermark or signature absent). 
Passive approach works on the basic assumption that video contains naturally occurring 
properties or inherent fingerprint which is unique to it due to different video imaging devices 
and its characteristics. If the video is not forged then the underlying statistical correlations of 
the given video remains consistent after some post processing operations. Identifying the 
difference, before and after video acquisition which may be malicious or non malicious 
alteration is the main task of various detection methodologies. In most cases passive forensics 
can be converted to a problem of pattern recognition [2]. [Figure 1] shows the passive 
approach for video forgery detection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 1. Passive approach for video forgery detection 
 
If a given video integrity need to be checked then several questions need to be 
answered like, which device (camera, scanner or Computer Graphics) generated the GOPs or 
video, is it generated as claimed, its processing history and techniques involved [3]. Most of 
the time the approach we follow is blind in real life since there will not be any recognized 
authentic video to compare the given. Feature extraction in all cases plays an important role 
in determining the authenticity. When we say a video is tampered then it contains two parts 
original part and the altered or tampered part. Researchers have proposed various methods 
and algorithms to identify digital video tampering based on different features. 
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Video tampering attacks can be classified based on the boundary of its occurrence into 
1. Spatial tampering attacks 
2. Temporal tampering attacks and 
3. Spatio - temporal tampering attacks 
[Figure 2] represents video tampering at the broader level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 2. Video forgery (tampering) classification 
 
[2] SPATIAL TAMPERING  
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morphing, inpainting, modifying, content addition and removal. Spatial tampering can be 
done at block or pixel level. In both cases objects of video frames are altered.  
 
[2.1] BLOCK LEVEL: 
Tampering attacks are performed on blocks of video frames. Block is basically a 
specified area on the frame of the video. Blocks can be cropped, replaced, morphed, and 
modified in any way in block level tampering. Luo et al. [4] proposed a method to detect the 
changes of GOP based on the blocking artefacts of sequential frames. 
 
[2.2] PIXEL LEVEL: 
Contents are modified at pixel level. It is the smallest level in video sequences at which 
tampering attack can be performed. Video authentication system should be robust enough to 
differentiate the normal video processing operation and pixel level tampering. Normal video 
processing operations are performed at pixel level. Cloning (copy-move), splicing and re-
sampling are the common pixel level operations found. 
Spatial tampering detection is also roughly categorized by Farid [5] into: 
Pixel based which include copy move, splicing, resampling. 
Chen et al. [6] have proposed video sequence matching based on temporal ordinal 
measurement which helps in video copy detection both at spatial and temporal levels. 
Format based like double mpeg compression, mpeg blocking. 
Tanfeng et al. [7] proposed a method based on MPEG double compression. Double 
compression will disturb Benford’s law for 1st digit distribution of quantized AC coefficients. 
Serial SVM is used to estimate the original bit rate scale in doubly compressed video. Milani 
et al. [8] considered number of compression steps (up to 3) applied to a video as evidence for 
video editing where classifiers based on multiple SVM were used. Chen et al. [9] modelled 
generalized Benford’s law to detect double compression in MPEG coded video. In the 
technique proposed the basic idea is that in a recompressed video the statistics of quantized or 
inverse quantized coefficients exhibit a deviation from that of original video and this 
difference is used to detect double compression. Disadvantage associated with this method is 
the edited (forged) raw frames which get single compressed while the rest get double 
compressed cannot be detected. 
Hardware or camera based tampering which include CFA, sensor noise,  camera response 
function, chromatic aberrations, demosaicing, white balancing.  
Popescu [10] used EM algorithm successfully to identify the demosaicing algorithm used 
by a particular camera. Mondaini et al.[11] detected video forgery with sensor pattern noise. 
Johnson et al. [12] exploited camera’s optical system by considering lateral chromatic 
aberrations which gets disturbed when image is forged or tampered. A block that deviated 
significantly from the global estimate was suspected to be tampered. Drawback is that they 
have assumed only a small portion of an image is tampered and it will not affect the global 
estimate. Hyun [13] proposed a technique to detect forgeries based on sensor pattern noise in 
surveillance videos. Upscale-Crop and partial manipulations forgeries are found with the help 
of MACE-MRH correlation filters by exploiting the scaling tolerance or invariance. Static 
scene videos have given impressive results over others. This method gave superior results for 
RGB/IR videos, static/dynamic videos and compressed videos too. 
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Physics based video tampering detection where various properties like phase congruency, 
light direction and environment is considered. 
Ravi et al. [14] demonstrated the presence of ENF signals in video recordings and 
lightings using optical sensors. It is used as a natural timestamp for video recordings under 
fluorescent lighting indoors. Statistical correlations are high with respect to ENF signals from 
the main supply when video is un tampered and discontinuities are found when it is tampered, 
which indicates temporal tampering. 
Geometry based like principal point and metric measurement. 
Timothy et al. [15] proposed motion interpolation technique. Modified mean shift 
mechanism allows a video tube separated into several layers, played in different speeds and 
then merged. Motion interpolation is proposed based on the reference stick figures and a 
video inpainting mechanism.  
In both block and pixel levels various background and foreground operations can happen. 
 
[2.3] OBJECT REMOVAL ATTACK: 
Here objects of video are eliminated, for example person elimination etc.  This kind of 
attack happen in a specific time domain, recorded in video. This attack can be performed with 
both foreground and background object. Hsu et al. [16] proposed a method aimed at 
tampering localization and video splicing was detected where an object is removed from a 
scene by analyzing the sensor noise characteristics. This method is suitable for detecting or 
capturing video inpainting tampering and not suitable for detecting other type of forgeries 
where frame rate is low and edited and on an uncompressed form. 
 
[2.4] OBJECT ADDITION ATTACK 
Here an object of interest can be inserted into a frame or to a set of frames; then it is 
spatial tampering attack. For example in video evidence, such act with the help of video 
editing software can mislead court of law. It can be performed with both foreground and 
background object. Kobayashi et al. [17][18] detected video forgeries using sensor noise 
patterns from static scene videos. Their proposed method depended on the codec used for 
video compression because of artefact noise and noise reduction. Splicing attacks are 
considered where a portion of a video sequence is copied on to another. Detector exploits the 
differences of noise characteristics between the original and the spliced sequence, being 
sensitive to compression. Disadvantage is that they can capture only copy-paste related 
forgery or video inpainting tampering and not suitable for detecting other types of forgeries 
where frame rate is low and edited on uncompressed form. 
 
[2.5] OBJECT MODIFICATION ATTACK: 
Modification can exist in many prospects in the given video. Size and shape of the 
existing object may be changed. Colour may be changed or discoloured. With the help of 
additional effect, nature of object and its relation with other object also may be changed. 
These attacks are performed generally at pixel level, For example changing face of a person 
to introduce new face. It can also be performed with both kinds of foreground and 
background object. Wang et al. [19] exposed intra video forgery based on video content. 
Regions or frames are replaced with duplicates from the same video sequence to hide 
 A SURVEY ON VIDEO FORGERY DETECTION 
 22 
unfavourable objects in a scene by overwriting these with background from other segments in 
the same video.  Frame duplication and region duplication are detected by means of analysis 
of correlations between original regions and cloned ones; Detecting unnatural high coherence 
is useful for discovering copy paste tampering. Since high coherence is found when region 
duplication is concerned, pair of tampered frames is assumed to be known a –priori. Global 
correlations are proposed which takes less time when compared. Drawback is that it cannot 
be used to detect superimposition caused by inserting objects from other videos. 
 
[3] TEMPORAL TAMPERING  
 It is performed on sequence of frames. Focus on temporal dependency. Such attacks 
are mainly affecting time sequence of visual information, captured by video recording device. 
Common attacks are: frame addition, Frame removal, Frame reordering, Frame shuffling.  
Temporal tampering can be at scene level, shot level, and frame level. Primary focus is 
on attacking the temporal dependency of frames of video called as `third dimensional attack’ 
with respect to time on the video sequence. Wang et al. [20] proposed a technique by 
analyzing the periodic properties of predictive ‘P’ frame prediction errors in MPEG-2 video 
to detect double compression. It can only detect double compressed intra frame ‘I’ in variable 
bit rate mode (i.e. Constant quantization scale factor). Wang et al. [21] also proposed a 
technique to detect double compression by capturing empty bins exhibited in the distribution 
of quantized coefficients in a recompressed video. Drawback of this approach is that it cannot 
detect if one or more bidirectional interpolated predictive frame ‘B’ or P frames are authentic 
or forged when the frame rate is low and the existence of evidence is captured in only a few 
frames. When the forged frames are edited in uncompressed form and then compressed they 
get single compressed while the rest double compressed, such frames cannot be detected. 
Shan et al. [22] proposed an efficient feature vector to expose fake high bit rate videos. They 
tried to estimate the original bit rate by analyzing the re quantization artefacts in ‘I’ frames as 
well as the quality change between a given video and its sequential bit rate down converted 
versions. These features are then combined with other video properties such as adaptive rate 
control schemes in video coding. Drawback of this method is that fake bit rate videos tested 
are recompressed with the same codec. Exposing those resulting video with different codec is 
the present requirement to work on. 
 
[3.1] FRAME ADDITION ATTACK:  
Additional frames from another video, which has same statistical property, are 
intentionally inserted at some random locations in a given video. It intends to camouflage the 
actual content and provide incorrect information. 
Gironia et al. [23] proposed inter frame forgery detection for various codec based 
videos where frames are inserted or deleted as part of tampering. Double encoding detection 
is done using VPF tool and sliding window analysis (moving) helps to identify the phase 
discontinuity of a periodic function if number of frames is removed. Localization of frames 
insertion helps to detect 2 cutting points, one at the beginning and the other one at the end of 
inserted frame sequence. Their proposed method cannot detect frame manipulation when 
whole GOP is removed /inserted. 
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[3.2] FRAME REMOVAL ATTACK 
  Frames are intentionally eliminated. In this kind of attack, frames can be removed from 
a specific location or it can be removed from different locations. Depending upon the 
intention it is generally performed on surveillance video where the intruder wants to remove 
his/her presence. 
Chao et al. [24] proposed to detect frame deletion and insertion through optical flow. 
Inter frame forgery would cause discontinuity in optical flow sequence. Yuxing et al. [25] 
proposed Video inter frame forgery detection based on discontinuities found in the relative 
factor sequence (VFI) after maximum sampling based on generalized ESD test which follows 
approximate normal distribution. Sequence varies for deletion and duplication. 
 
[3.3] FRAME SHUFFLING ATTACK 
Here frames of a given video are shuffled or reordered in such a way that correct frame 
sequence is intermingled and wrong information is produced by the video when compared to 
original video. Yuting et al. [26], Stamm et al. [27] have proposed inter frame forgery 
detection by exploiting the frame grouping strategy adopted by all common video encoders. 
 
 
[4] SPATIO TEMPORAL TAMPERING  
It is a combination of temporal and spatial tampering. Frame sequences and visual 
contents are modified in the same video. It is done at scene level. Intra frame tampering and 
inter frame tampering combination is found here. Various tampering methods found in spatial 
and temporal tampering domains are also found here.  
Bestagini et al. [28], have proposed algorithm/method that is able to detect whether a 
spatio temporal region of a sequence or GOP was replaced by series of fixed repeated images 
in time by analyzing the footprints left on the residual computed between adjacent frames 
which is robust to mild compression, or a portion of the same video is taken at different 
interval of time by exploiting correlation analysis. Tampering localization fails when the 
duplicated block is not correctly identified. Subramanyam et al. [29] detected splicing from 
the same frame by matching histogram of oriented gradients (HOG). Compositing where an 
object from one frame is copied to another frame is detected by exploiting MPEG-2 GOP 
structure. Connotter et al. [30] exposed forgery based on video content. Their proposed 
technique explicitly models the three-dimensional ballistic motion of objects in free-flight 
and the two-dimensional projection of the trajectory into the image plane of a static or 
moving camera. Deviations from this model provide evidence of manipulation. 
Subramanyam et al. [31] proposed an algorithm which uses principal of estimation theory to 
detect double quantization. CRLB is applied or attained to find the efficient estimator for the 
likelihood function. It can detect tampering of ‘I’, ‘P’ or ‘B’ frames with high accuracy. 
Proposed technique can detect forgery under wide range of double compression bit rates or 
quantization scale factors. 
 Wang et al. [32] uncovered digital forgeries in interlaced and deinterlaced video by 
detecting spatial and temporal localized tampering. Interlaced video creates spatial artifacts 
for moving object at fast rate. Their model measures, interfield and interframe motion by 
performing motion estimation and spatial/temporal differentiation. Motion estimation remains 
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same for both, if original video otherwise tampered. Deinterlaced video correlations are 
explicitly modeled by field extension algorithms like that of line repetition, line averaging, 
field insertion & vertical temporal interpolation algorithm, motion adaptive and motion 
compensated estimation algorithm. Once the deinterlaced videos are modeled using any of 
these correlation algorithms spatial and temporal correlations are found by choosing linear 
model and EM algorithm is used. Tampering can be locally identified both in time and space. 
Both algorithms are used to detect frame rate conversion which varies if a video is altered or 
manipulated.  Limitations are the correlation estimation success is based on compression 
artifacts for an interlaced and a deinterlaced video. A deinterlaced video may be tampered 
initially and then interlaced for which a de-interlacing algorithm may be applied such that 
correlation appear to remain intact. 
Object based video forgery detection is done by Richao et al. [33] where statistical 
property of an object and variable width of its neighbor area is considered with adjustable 
width object boundary (AWOB) defined. Non sub sampled contourlet coefficients and 
gradient information exploits the image edge locally with the help of Gaussian distribution 
model. Edge intensities are analyzed with the help of Rayleigh distribution. SVM classifier 
(RBF of libsvm library) is used to separate the natural objects and forged ones. Main 
drawback is that the trained sample database is required. Standard Video forensic dataset too 
is still in need. Renjie et al. [34] addressed an efficient spatio temporal scheme to extract 
moving objects from video sequence. During temporal segmentation moving objects are 
localized and examined with the help of block based motion detector to identify the changed 
region. Slow and fast motion of objects is considered. Once temporal segmentation is 
complete, identify the static and dynamic regions, spatial segmentation is done with the help 
of watershed algorithm. A combination of these segmentations with a fixed threshold is then 
used to detect desired moving objects. Results are not much impressive where the video 
sequence is short. Identifying the objects with moving background using global motion 
estimation needs to be addressed further. 
Thus Digital video tampering can be done at various stages; Scene level, shot level, 
frame level, block level and pixel level or a combination of these levels. [Figure 3] represents 
video tampering relationship. Depending on the tampering level we classify them into 
temporal, spatial and spatio temporal attacks. Currently maximum work is found in spatial 
tampering detection since it is close to image forgery detection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 3. Spatio temporal relationship 
Passive tampering detection schemes include learning based schemes, threshold 
based schemes and schemes based on compression properties. Coding bit rate has a 
significant impact on the efficiency of the algorithm since lower the quality of video, longer 
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the sequence to be analyzed. We need to understand how a specific form of tampering 
disturbs certain statistical properties of the video and then develop a mathematical model 
/algorithm to detect this perturbation. 
 
 [5] CONCLUSION 
Digital video forensics is still in its infant stage. Reliability of the digital video as a 
reference to reality is under threat due to tampering. Various editing tools like Adobe’s 
Photoshop & illustrator, GNU Gimp, Premier, Vegas are available easily [35]. Research 
community needs to establish various methods or tampering detection schemes at all levels of 
video classification. Of the many kinds of perturbations that tampering can introduce into a 
video, we have explored and listed few works till recent. With respect to passive technology, 
selecting the key patterns are deterministic in determining whether the video is tampered or 
not. The more developed field of image forensics can provide a source of new ideas for future 
video forensic tools. Standard video dataset containing forged and authenticated videos under 
various conditions are the requirement of the day for researchers to evaluate their proposed 
methods. We need to combine together various proposed approaches to detect many kinds of 
tampering operations. 
Improvement in the field of digital video forensics particularly tampering detection will 
help us in improving the reliability factor for digital video and we will be able to understand 
their properties in a much better way in the field of entertainment industry, surveillance 
video, medical field and legal concerns. New methods combining both active and passive 
based approach will rule the future video forensics era with the domain knowledge or 
expertise involving pattern recognition, artificial intelligence, signal processing, and machine 
learning & computer vision [36]. 
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